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PRODUCT CATEGORY LIABILITY:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
by Richard C. Ausness'
INTRODUCTION
Professor Wertheimer has proposed that courts be allowed to
hold producers strictly liable for product-related injuries, even
though their products are not otherwise defective, as long as the
overall risks associated with such products outweigh their bene-
fits.2 However, this would subject the sellers of inherently dan-
gerous products, such as cigarettes, to potentially devastating
liability since their products cannot be made less dangerous.
There are better ways to control the consumption of hazardous
products if society wishes to do so.
Part I of this article discusses the scope and purpose of the
defect requirement in section 402A' and in the proposed Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts. Part II examines the concept of product
category liability and chronicles its universal rejection by the
courts. Part III analyzes various policy arguments for and
against categorical liability. Part IV considers some of the prob-
lems associated with using tort law to regulate product safety.
Finally, Part V identifies some alternatives to an expansion of
tort liability.
1. Professor Richard C. Ausness is the Ashland Oil Professor of Law at the
University of Kentucky.
2. See Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category Lia-
bility and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV.
1429, 1454 (1994).
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
4. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1(a) (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995).
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I. STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. The Defect Requirement
Strict liability, as codified in section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, has now largely replaced negligence and im-
plied warranty as the preferred theory of recovery against prod-
uct sellers.5 Section 402A imposes strict liability upon any prod-
uct seller who sells a product which is in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to a user or consumer or to their proper-
ty.' Under this approach, the focus is theoretically on the
product's condition, rather than the manufacturer's conduct.7
Consequently, an injured party may recover without proving that
the product seller was at fault.'
However, strict liability is not intended to impose absolute
liability.' Thus, product sellers are subject to liability only when
their products are defective in some way.0 Courts" and com-
5. See Barbara L. Atwell, Products Liability and Preemption: A Judicial
Framework, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 181, 194 (1991) (stating that "as a result of ... sec-
tion 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts, strict liability has become a widely
accepted basis for liability in products liability cases"); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at 694 (5th ed. 1984).
6. Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller
is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and
does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exer-
cised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or
consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation
with the seller.
7. See, e.g., Jackson v. Harsco Corp., 673 P.2d 363, 365 (Colo. 1983); Phipps v.
General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 958 (Md. 1976); Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co.,
683 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wash. 1984).
8. See Waterson v. General Motors Corp., 544 A.2d 357, 372 (N.J. 1988) ("The
essence of an action in strict liability is that the injured party is relieved of the
burden of proving the manufacturer's negligence.").
9. See, e.g., Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 654 P.2d 343, 353 (Haw. 1982);
Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 181 (Mich. 1984); Bellotte v. Zayre Corp.,
352 A.2d 723, 724 (N.H. 1976); Shawver v. Roberts Corp., 280 N.W.2d 226, 231 (Wis.
1979).
10. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 879 (Alaska 1979) ("A
product must be defective as marketed if liability is to attach, and 'defective' must
mean something more than a condition causing physical injury."); Michael J. Toke,
Note, Categorical Liability for Manifestly Unreasonable Designs: Why the Comment d
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mentators 2 have traditionally divided product defects into three
categories: manufacturing defects, design defects and defective
warnings. A manufacturing defect is an unintended condition
that arises from some mishap in the production process. 3 A
design defect occurs when the entire product line shares a com-
mort dangerous characteristic." Finally; a product that is other-
wise properly manufactured may be rendered defective because
of inadequate warnings or instructions provided to product us-
ers.
15
Since no single definition of defect is broad enough to cover
every type of dangerous condition," courts have employed a va-
riety of tests to determine if a product is defective. For example,
under the "deviation from the norm test," a product is considered
defective if it deviates from the manufacturer's intended design
or if it is inferior in workmanship to products of the same de-
scription. 7 A second test, known as the "consumer expectation
Caveat Should Be Removed from the Restatement (Third), 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1181,
1205-06 (1996).
Many jurisdictions require that a product be both unreasonably dangerous and
defective. See David A. Fischer, Products Liability---The Meaning of Defect, 39 MO. L.
REv. 339, 342 (1974). However, a number of courts no longer require plaintiffs to
prove that a product is unreasonably dangerous as long as they can establish that
the product is defective. See Butand v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543
P.2d 209, 214 (Alaska 1975); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1161-62
(Cal. 1972); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020, 1027 (Pa. 1978).
11. See Lantis v. Astec Indus., Inc., 648 F.2d 1118, 1120 (7th Cir. 1981);
Gianitsis v. American Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 856 (D.N.H. 1988).
12. See David G. Owen, The Graying of Products Liability Law: Paths Taken and
Untaken in the New Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1241, 1243 (1994).
13. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978) (stating that a
product with a manufacturing or production defect is "one that differs from the
manufacturer's intended result or from other ostensibly identical units of the same
product line"); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 417 N.E.2d 545, 552-53 (N.Y. 1981) (ex-
plaining that "a defectively manufactured product ... results from some mishap in
the manufacturing process itself, improper workmanship, or because defective materi-
als were used in construction").
14. See Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978) ("A de-
sign defect occurs when the product is manufactured in conformity with the intended
design but the design itself poses unreasonable dangers to consumers.").
15. See Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prod. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 716 (5th Cir.
1986); Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 338 (5th Cir. 1984).
16. See, e.g., Barker, 573 P.2d at 453 (recognizing that the term "defect" "is nei-
ther self-defining nor susceptible to a single definition applicable in all contexts").
17. See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 304 (N.J. 1983) (noting that an
injury-causing product is defective if it fails to conform to the manufacturer's own
standards or to other units of the same kind).
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test," is derived from implied warranty principles." According
to this test, a product is deemed to be defective if it turns out to
be more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect it to
be.'9 A third test, commonly referred to as the "risk-utility test,"
provides that a product will be considered defective if the risks
associated with the product exceed its overall utility."0 This test
is often used in design defect litigation to treat a product as
defective when the utility of the product with an alternative and
more safe design outweighs the utility of the product as actually
designed.2
B. Inherently Dangerous Products
Many products are inherently dangerous. For some products,
the danger cannot be eliminated without impairing the product's
intended function.22 For example, the sharp edge of a knife can
be hazardous to users of the product, but a knife cannot perform
its intended function properly if its blade is dull.23 Another
group of inherently dangerous products is characterized by haz-
ards that are not consciously designed into the product.24 For
example, the carcinogenic properties of asbestos do nothing to
enhance its fire retardant qualities.25 Tobacco also appears to fit
18. See Fischer, supra note 10, at 348 ('The law of implied warranty is vitally
concerned with protecting justified expectations since this is a fundamental policy of
the law of contract.").
19. See Tiderman v. Fleetwood Homes, 684 P.2d 1302, 1305 (Wash. 1984)(en
banc)("A product is not reasonably safe when it is unsafe to an extent beyond which
would be reasonably contemplated by the ordinary consumer.").
20. See Barker, 573 P.2d at 454 (holding that a product may be found defective
in design . . . if the jury finds that the risk of danger inherent in the challenged
design outweighs the benefits of such design"); O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 306; Wilson v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1326 (Or. 1978)(en banc).
21. See Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978)
("[L]iability may attach if the manufacturer did not take available and reasonable
steps to lessen or eliminate the danger of even a significantly useful or desirable
product.").
22. See Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment K and
for Strict Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 857 (1983). Professor Page refers to the
risk from this type of product as a "generic design risk." Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 857-58. Professor Page refers to the risk from this type of product as a
"generic nondesign risk." Id. at 858.
25. Id.
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within this category.26
1. Liability Under Section 402A
In general, it appears that section 402A does not impose strict
liability on the sellers of inherently dangerous products as long
as a proper warning is given. The first impediment to liability is
the requirement that a product be defective. When an attempt
was made to delete the word "defective" from a draft version of
section 402A during a floor debate in 1961, Dean Prosser, the
Reporter for the proposed Restatement, declared that the defect
requirement was intended to protect the sellers of whiskey, ciga-
rettes and other inherently dangerous products from liability.
27
The drafters also addressed this issue in comment i to section
402A28 which purported to define the term "unreasonably dan-
gerous." In comment i, the drafters declared that "[g]ood whiskey
is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some
people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics."29 Thus,
only "bad whiskey," such as whiskey contaminated with danger-
ous levels of fusel oil, could be described as unreasonably danger-
ous."o The drafters also observed that "[g]ood tobacco is not un-
reasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may
be harmful."'" To be treated as unreasonably dangerous, tobacco
would have to contain "something like marijuana."2 Similarly,
"good butter" is not to be regarded as unreasonably dangerous
simply because it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to
heart attacks; only "bad butter," such as butter contaminated
with poisonous fish oil, would qualify for unreasonably danger-
ous status.33
According to the drafters of comment i, the reason good whis-
key, good tobacco and good butter are not unreasonably danger-
ous is because the consuming public is aware of the health risks
associated with these products. 4 This same reasoning underlies
26. Id.
27. Id. at 861-62.
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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comment g, which defines what is meant by a "defective condi-
tion." 5 In this provision, the drafters state that a product seller
is strictly liable "only where a product is, at the time it leaves
the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ulti-
mate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to
him."3 Presumably, ordinary consumers would be sufficiently
familiar with the risks associated with commonly used inherent-
ly dangerous products, such as knives, cigarettes and whiskey,
that these products would not be regarded as defective according
to the criterion set forth in comment g.
It should be mentioned that another provision, comment k,37
also deals with inherently dangerous products. Comment k clas-
sifies certain products as "unavoidably unsafe" and excludes
them from section 402A's strict liability regime.3" However, sec-
tion 402A's legislative history indicates that comment k was pri-
marily concerned with pharmaceutical products. 9
2. Liability Under the Third Restatement of Torts
The drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Torts4" have also
exempted inherently dangerous products from liability. One
provision of the new Restatement imposes liability on product
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. g (1965).
36. Id.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. k (1965).
38. See id. ("There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary
use. These are especially common in the field of drugs."). See generally Richard C.
Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and Strict Products Liability: What Liability
Rule Should Be Applied to the Sellers of Pharmaceutical Products?, 78 KY. L.J. 705
(1989-90).
39. See Page, supra note 22, at 864-66. Since section 402A's adoption, most courts
have refused to extend it to other products. See, e.g., Blevins v. Cushman Motors,
551 S.W.2d 602, 608 (Mo. 1977) (holding that golf carts were not unavoidably unsafe
products because they could be made safe for their intended use); Netzel v. State
Sand & Gravel Co., 186 N.W.2d 258, 264 (Wis. 1971) (declaring that ordinary con-
crete mix could not be found unavoidably unsafe merely because it contained caustic
ingredients). But see Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 516 (5th
Cir. 1984) (suggesting that asbestos products might qualify as unavoidably unsafe),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d
811, 814 (6th Cir. 1982) (also suggesting that asbestos products might qualify as
unavoidably unsafe).
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1995).
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sellers who distribute defective products.4' Other provisions
enumerate and define the three types of product defect: manu-
facturing defect, design defect and inadequate instructions or
warnings.42 Yet, since none of these definitions appear to cover
inherently dangerous products, one may reasonably conclude
that they are not subject to liability under the new Restatement.
It is possible that inherently dangerous products could fall
within the category of defectively designed products. However, a
product is considered to be defectively designed only if the risk
"could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reason-
able alternative design by the seller or other distributor . . .,,4
This alternative design requirement effectively insulates such
inherently dangerous products as cigarettes, alcoholic beverages
and firearms from design defect liability.44 Indeed, in comment
c the drafters themselves acknowledge that sellers of inherently
dangerous products should not be held strictly liable under the
principles of liability set forth in the Restatement (Third) of
Torts:
The requirement in § 2(b) that plaintiff show a reasonable
alternative design applies even though the plaintiff alleges that
the category of product sold by the defendant is so dangerous that
it should not have been marketed at all. Thus common and widely
distributed products such as alcoholic beverages, tobacco, fire-
arms, and above-ground swimming pools may be found to be
defective only upon proof of the requisite conditions in § 2(a), §
2(b), or 2(c).45
Thus, it seems clear that the sellers of inherently dangerous
products, such as cigarettes, will not be subject to strict liability
under the traditional approach of section 402A, or under the
liability scheme proposed by the drafters of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts.
41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (a).
42. Id. §§ 1 (b), 2.
43. Id. § 2 (b).
44. See Wertheimer, supra note 2, at 1443; Toke, supra note 10, at 1200.
45. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2, cmt. c at 21.
1997] 429
NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW
II. PRODUCT CATEGORY LIABILITY
Since conventional product liability doctrines do not appear to
work very well, plaintiffs have been obliged to develop new lia-
bility theories to support their claims against the sellers of in-
herently dangerous products. The most promising group of theo-
ries involves categorical product liability. Under this approach, a
court may conclude that an entire product category, such as
handguns or cigarettes, is subject to liability even in the absence
of a specific defect.46
A. Theories of Liability
Two theories of categorical product liability have emerged
during the past fifteen years: under the first theory, the manu-
facture and sale of certain types of products is labeled "ultrahaz-
ardous"; under the second theory, strict liability is imposed on
product sellers if the risks associated with a particular class of
product outweigh its utility.
1. The Ultrahazardous Activity Theory
One legal theory that plaintiffs have frequently invoked is the
doctrine that individuals or enterprises engaged in ultrahazard-
ous or abnormally dangerous activities should be held strictly
liable for any injuries that they cause to others.47 It has been
proposed that this form of strict liability, based on the principle
of Rylands v. Fletcher," should be applied to sellers of inherent-
ly dangerous products.49 The "ultrahazardous activity" theory
46. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American
Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1263, 1297 (1991) [hereinafter Frontier] (explaining that "once a category is
identified as appropriate for strict liability, by implication all the products within
that category would be measured according to a no-defect strict liability stan-
dard . . . ").
47. This theory of strict liability was first suggested by an English court in
Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. (1868). In the United States, it was incorporated
into the Restatement of Torts, which imposed strict liability on those who engaged in
"ultrahazardous" activities. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1939). The Re-
statement (Second) of Torts broadened the scope of strict liability to include "abnor-
mally dangerous" activities. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1977).
48. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
49. See John L. Diamond, Eliminating the "Defect" in Design Strict Products Lia-
bility Theory, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 529, 549 (1983) ('Traditional strict liability clearly
430 [Vol. 24:3
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has often been invoked by those who have been injured by hand-
guns or other firearms.5"
For a variety of reasons, however, almost no court has been
willing to find that the manufacture or sale of firearms is an
ultrahazardous activity." First of all courts have been reluctant
to broaden the scope of a doctrine which has traditionally been
limited to landowner liability.52 Second, they have been unwill-
ing to extend strict liability to an activity that is a matter of
common usage.53 Finally, they have been concerned about the
possible economic effects of such a liability rule.54
should be imposed on the manufacturers of products that are abnormally dangerous
in all uses and applications.").
50. See, e.g., Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1533 (11th Cir.
1986); Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir. 1986); Perkins v.
F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1252 (5th Cir. 1985); Martin v. Harrington & Richard-
son, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1201-02 (7th Cir. 1984); Caveny v. Raven Arms Co., 665 F.
Supp. 530, 531 (S.D. Ohio 1987), affd, 849 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1988); Armijo v. Ex
Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 774 (D.N.M. 1987), affd, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988);
Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 194 (E.D. La. 1983); Hammond v.
Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 565 A.2d 558, 562 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989); Kelley v. R.G.
Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1146 (Md. 1985); Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & loan, Inc.,
748 P.2d 661, 664 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
51. See, e.g., Shipman, 791 F.2d at 1534; Moore, 789 F.2d at 1328; Perkins, 762
F.2d at 1268; Martin, 743 F.2d at 1205-06; Caveny, 665 F. Supp. at 531; Armijo, 656
F. Supp. at 775; Hammond, 565 A.2d at 563; Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1147 (holding that
"the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine does not apply to the manufacture or
marketing of handguns"); Knott, 748 P.2d at 664-65 (holding that "the manufacture,
distribution and sale of a handgun is not a high-risk, ultrahazardous activity"). But
see Richman, 571 F. Supp. at 208 (concluding that the plaintiff could proceed with
her claim under the law of ultrahazardous activities).
52. See, e.g., Shipman, 791 F.2d at 1534 (recognizing that Florida courts have all
applied the ultrahazardous activity doctrine to impose strict liability for damages
resulting from activities which occur on land and pose an unusual and unnecessarily
high risk of harm to neighboring land owners and their property"); Perkins, 762 F.2d
at 1267 (explaining that all Louisiana courts have imposed absolute liability under
the label "ultrahazardous" in cases involving activities relating to immovables); Kelley,
497 A.2d at 1147 (holding that the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine does not
apply because "[tihe dangers inherent in the use of a handgun in the commission of
a crime . . .bear no relation to any occupation or ownership of land").
53. See, e.g., Moore, 789 F.2d at 1328 (stating that "[tihey are widely used, and
the harm they pose comes from their use rather than by the nature of their exis-
tence alone"); Caveny, 665 F. Supp. at 532 (holding that the ultrahazardous activity
doctrine does not apply to matters of common usage, and stating that "[w]ithout a
doubt manufacturing and distributing handguns is a matter of common usage');
Armijo, 656 F. Supp. at 774; Richman, 571 F. Supp. at 202; Hammond, 565 A.2d at
563.
54. See, e.g., Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1269 (explaining that if the court were to clas-
sify the marketing of a handgun as an ultrahazardous activity, nothing would pre-
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2. The Risk-Utility Theory
The risk-utility theory is even more popular with plaintiffs.
According to this concept, manufacturers and other sellers may
be held strictly liable under section 402A even in the absence of
a conventional defect.55 Such products are considered "defective"
because the accident costs that they generate outweigh the bene-
fits that the public derives from their use and consumption.56
During the past decade or so, plaintiffs have invoked this theory
in connection with such inherently dangerous products as above-
ground swimming pools,57  trail bikes,"8 firearms,59  tobacco
products,6" alcoholic beverages"1  and asbestos.62  However,
vent extension "to the manufacturers of any instrumentality that can be used danger-
ously, such as knives, lead pipes, explosives, automobiles, alcohol, and rolling pins").
See also Martin, 743 F.2d at 1204; Caveny, 665 F. Supp. at 531-32; Armijo, 656 F.
Supp. at 774-75; Richman, 571 F. Supp. at 200; Hammond, 565 A.2d at 563.
55. See Harvey M. Grossman, Categorical Liability: Why the Gates Should Be
Kept Closed, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 385, 386 (1995) (explaining that this new theory
called "categorical liability" would "hold manufacturers accountable for injuries from
products in certain generic categories even though no independent, traditional defect
in manufacture, design or warnings was proved").
56. See Toke, supra note 10, at 1185 (explaining that under this theory, products
are defective when they fail a gross risk-utility analysis: i.e. when "the overall bene-
fit they provide is outweighed by the accident costs they generate").
57. See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 306 (N.J. 1983).
58. See Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655, 660 (Wash. 1986) (en banc).
59. See, e.g., Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1533 (11th Cir.
1986); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1273 (5th Cir. 1985); Armijo v. Ex
Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D.N.M. 1987); Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d
758, 762 (D.C. 1989); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293,
1298 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987); Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661, 663 (Wash. Ct. App.
1988).
60. See Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1224 (1st Cir. 1990),
vacated, 505 U.S. 1215, reaffd on remand, 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992) (explaining
appellant's argument as that "when one balances risk against utility, cigarettes per
se are so unreasonably dangerous as to be actionably defective"). See also Roysdon v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 236 (6th Cir. 1988); Miller v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., 679 F. Supp. 485, 486 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir.
1988) (stating that "from a risk-utility analysis, the health risks (i.e. lung cancer)
outweigh any benefits to society."); Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149,
1159 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Hite v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco. Co., 578 A.2d 417, 421 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990).
61. See Dauphin Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 596 A.2d 845,
849 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
62. See Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 113 (La. 1986).
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plaintiffs have been successful in only three instances.63
a. Cases Applying the Risk-Utility Theory
One of the first cases to recognize product category liability
was O'Brien v. Muskin Corp. ,64 decided by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court in 1983. O'Brien involved a lawsuit by an individual
who was injured while diving into a shallow above-ground swim-
ming pool.6" The injured party brought suit against Muskin
Corporation, the manufacturer of the swimming pool, alleging
that the product was defectively designed because its vinyl liner
was too slippery.66 The trial court refused to submit the design
defect claim to the jury and the plaintiff appealed. 7 On appeal,
the O'Brien court acknowledged that it was appropriate to con-
sider available alternative designs as part of a risk-utility analy-
sis" However, the court also declared that there are some prod-
ucts which are so dangerous and so useless that the risks associ-
ated with their use outweigh their benefits.69 In such instances,
product sellers should bear the cost of liability for harm to in-
jured consumers even though no safer alternative is available.7"
The court then concluded that "the trial court should have per-
mitted the jury to consider whether, because of the dimensions of
the pool and the slipperiness of the bottom, the risks of injury so
outweighed the [pool's] utility ... as to constitute a defect."'" In
the court's words:
[v]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
even if there are no alternative methods of making bottoms for
above-ground pools, the jury might have found that the risk
posed by the pool outweighed its utility.72
63. See Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 110; Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143
(Md. 1985); OBrien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983).
64. 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983).
65. Id. at 302. The plaintiff was injured when he struck his head on the bottom
of the pool. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 303.
68. Id. at 305 ('The assessment of the utility of a design involves the consider-
ation of available alternatives.").
69. Id. at 306.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
4331997]
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The second case when strict liability was imposed on an entire
product category was Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc. 3 In Kelley,
the victim of a grocery store robbery brought suit against the
manufacturer of the "Saturday Night Special" handgun 4 that
was used by the perpetrator of the crime. The plaintiff con-
tended that the manufacturer was subject to strict liability under
the provisions of section 402A." The Maryland Supreme Court
acknowledged that the handgun in question was not defective
under the consumer expectation test because a consumer would
expect a handgun to have the capacity to fire a bullet.7 Fur-
ther, the handgun was not defective. under conventional risk-
utility analysis because nothing went wrong with the product. 8
However, the court went on to consider whether manufacturers
and sellers of handguns might be strictly liable to gunshot vic-
tims on a categorical basis. 9
The court did not engage in any sort of formal risk-utility
analysis. Instead, it examined various gun control statutes to see
if Congress or the state legislature had reached any conclusions
about the risks and benefits of handguns.'0 This examination
led the court to conclude that the existence of state statutory
provisions expressly allowing private persons to own and carry
handguns indicated that such activities were not contrary to
public policy." Presumably, this meant that the risks of hand-
guns in general did not outweigh their utility. For this reason,
the court declined to increase the burden of manufacturer liabili-
ty on all handguns.8" However, the court then acknowledged an
73. 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985).
74. See H. Todd Iveson, Manufacturers' Liability to Victims of Handgun Crime: A
Common Law Approach, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 771, 791-92 (1983) (stating that the
risks of Saturday Night Specials are great because they are "easily concealable" and
"relatively inexpensive," and that their countervailing utility is minimal because the
poor quality of manufacture "precludes their use for most legitimate purposes").
75. See Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1144-45.
76. Id. at 1147-48.
77. Id. at 1148.
78. Id. at 1148-49.
79. Id. at 1150 (acknowledging that "[tihe fact that a handgun manufacturer or
marketer generally would not be liable for gunshot injuries ... under previously
recognized principles of strict liability is not necessarily dispositive'.
80. Id. at 1151-53.
81. Id. at 1152-53.
82. Id. at 1153 (stating that "to impose strict liability upon the manufacturers or
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exception for a limited category of handguns.83 Specifically, the
court determined that the treatment of Saturday Night Specials
in state and federal gun control statutes indicated that such
weapons were largely unfit for any legitimate use.84 In addition,
the court found that the manufacturers and sellers of Saturday
Night Specials were well aware that the principal use for their
products was criminal activity. 5 Consequently, the court con-
cluded that it was appropriate to place such weapons in a special
category for purposes of civil liability.88
The third case when a court applied a risk-utility analysis to
achieve categorical product liability was Halphen v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp.87 The injured party in Halphen allegedly
died as the result of exposure to asbestos and his widow brought
suit against an asbestos manufacturer.88 The case was tried in
federal district court and the jury found in the plaintiff's favor.89
The federal appeals court first affirmed the lower court's judg-
ment, but then certified to the Louisiana Supreme Court the
question of whether, under state law, the defendant could be
held liable notwithstanding the fact that the inherent risks asso-
ciated with the product were scientifically unknowable at the
time it was marketed.90
The Louisiana court declared that an injured party could re-
cover against the seller under principles of strict liability if the
product was unreasonably dangerous because of a manufacturing
defect, an inadequate warning or an unsafe design.9 However,
the court also declared that some products could be considered
"unreasonably dangerous per se."92 According to the Halphen
court, a product is unreasonably dangerous per se "if a reason-
marketers of handguns for gunshot injuries resulting from the misuse of handguns
by others, would be contrary to Maryland public policy as set forth by the Legisla-
ture").
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1158.
85. Id. at 1159.
86. Id. (holding that it is consistent with public policy to hold manufacturers and
marketers of Saturday Night Specials strictly liable to victims of gunshot injuries
that result from criminal use of their products).
87. 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986).
88. Id. at 112.
89. Id. at 112-13.
90. Id. at 113.
91. Id. at 114-15.
92. Id. at 113.
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able 'person would conclude that the danger-in-fact of the prod-
uct, whether foreseeable or not, outweighs the utility of the prod-
uct." The court also pointed out that a hindsight test would be
used to evaluate a product's risks and benefits for purposes of
determining whether it would be subject to categorical liabili-
ty.94 Specifically, the court stated that:
[t]his theory considers the product's danger-in-fact, not whether
the manufacturer perceived or could have perceived the danger,
because the theory's purpose is to evaluate the product itself, not
the manufacturer's conduct. Likewise, the benefits are those ac-
tually found to flow from the use of the product, rather than as
perceived at the time the product was designed and marketed.95
The Halphen court concluded that if a plaintiff proved that a
product was unreasonably dangerous per se, it would not matter
that the case could have been tried as a conventional design
defect case.96 In reaching that conclusion, the court thereby sug-
gested that categorical liability would not be limited to products
that were inherently dangerous. 7
O'Brien, Kelley, and Halphen are the only cases in which
courts have held that categorical liability can be imposed upon
product sellers within the framework of section 402A. However,
each of these cases generated intense criticism at the time they
were decided and each was eventually overruled by legisla-
tion.9
b. Cases Rejecting the Risk-Utility Theory
The vast majority of courts have refused to accept the notion
of categorical product liability based on a risk-utility analysis.99
93. Id. at 114.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56 (1) (West 1991) (overruling Halphen v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp.); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27 § 36-I (h) (1996) (overruling
Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3 (a) (West 1987) (overrul-
ing O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.). Two other decisions, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
649 F. Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1986), and Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d
1239 (N.J. 1990), followed the reasoning of the O'Brien decision, but like O'Brien,
were superseded by the statutory change in New Jersey's products liability law.
99. See Grossman, supra note 55, at 398 ("W/hen confronted with real world cas-
es, the courts have persistently refused to embrace categorical liability.").
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Products where this approach has been rejected include fire-
arms,1'0 alcoholic beverages °' and, of more importance, to-
bacco products.02 Some of the cases which have rejected cate-
gorical liability for cigarettes are discussed in more detail below.
In Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp.,13 a former asbestos worker
brought suit in federal court against various asbestos manufac-
turers and a cigarette company, alleging that the synergistic
effect of smoking and working with asbestos products caused him
to develop lung cancer. 10 4  The plaintiff argued that the
defendant's cigarettes were defectively designed and that they
failed the risk-utility test.'° The federal district court dis-
100. See Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1533-34 (11th Cir.
1986) (recognizing that "Florida law will not apply ... strict products liability . . .
to a gun manufacturer who produces and distributes weapons that perform as in-
tended and designed"); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1274 (5th Cir. 1985)
(stating that "[n]o court in this jurisdiction has ever applied a general risk/utility
analysis to a well-made product that functioned precisely as it was designed to do");
Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D.N.M. 1987), affd, 843 F.2d 406
(10th Cir. 1988) (stating its belief "that New Mexico courts would follow the over-
whelming weight of authority which rejects strict products liability as a theory for
holding handgun manufacturers liable for the criminal misuse of their products");
Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (acknowledging that
"[tlhe cases uniformly hold that the doctrine of strict liability under the doctrine of
402A is not applicable unless there is some malfunction due to an improper or inad-
equate design or defect in manufacturing'). See also Knott v. Liberty Jewelry &
Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661, 664 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988); Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564
A.2d 758, 762 (D.C. 1989); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d
1293, 1299 (11. App. Ct. 1985).
101. See Dauphin Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 596 A.2d 845,
849 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
102. See Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1225 (1st Cir. 1990),
vacated, 505 U.S. 1215, reaffd on remand, 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992) ("It is illogical
to say that a product is defective .in its generic form when 'defect' has historically
been measured in reference to the availability, or at least the feasibility, of safer
alternatives."); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 236 (6th Cir.
1988) ("Because the record contains no evidence whatever that the use of the
defendant's cigarettes presents risks greater than those known to be associated with
smoking, we find that a reasonable jury could not find that the cigarettes were de-
fective."); Miller v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 679 F. Supp. 485, 489 (E.D.
Pa.), affd, 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988) (concluding that "Pennsylvania courts have
not adopted, and will not adopt, the risk-utility theory of liability as the present
state of the law"). See also Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149, 1159 (E.D.
Pa. 1987); Hite v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 578 A.2d 417, 421 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990).
103. 674 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
104. Id. at 1151.
105. Id. at 1157.
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missed the design defect claim because the plaintiff failed to
show that the cigarettes were defective in any way."'
Liability under the plaintiff's second claim was predicated on
the theory that "the risks caused by cigarettes outweigh their
social utility."'' 7 The court, however, concluded that Pennsylva-
nia courts would refuse to recognize a claim based on categorical
liability."8  Accordingly, the Gunsalus court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs risk-
utility claim."
Similarly, in Gianitsis v. American Brands, Inc., ° the plain-
tiff sought damages from several tobacco manufacturers and
distributors, claiming that smoking caused his lung cancer.'
In his complaint, the plaintiff contended that "the risks associat-
ed with smoking an ordinary cigarette, far outweigh the social
value or utility of cigarettes to our society."' 12
The court declared that, as an initial matter, the plaintiff
must show that the product in question was defective."' This
meant that the product must have contained either a manufac-
turing flaw, a defective design or an inadequate warning."'
Only after establishing the existence of a defect would the plain-
tiff need to prove that the defect in question made the product
unreasonably dangerous." 5 In the court's view, the risk-utility
test, as formulated by Dean Wade,"' was only relevant to the
question of whether the product was unreasonably danger-
ous." '7 Consequently, since the plaintiff did not show the ciga-
rettes to be defective, the court concluded as a matter of law,
that the plaintiff could not recover simply by proving that the
106. Id. at 1158-59. The court also ruled that any claim based on failure to warn
was preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-1341 (1988). Id.
107. Gunsalus, 674 F. Supp. at 1159.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 685 F. Supp. 853 (D.N.H. 1988).
111. Id. at 854.
112. Id. at 855.
113. Id. at 856 (stating that the basis of any 402A claim is an allegation of a
defect associated with the product).
114.. Id.
115. Id.
116. See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44
MIss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973).
117. Gianitsis, 685 F. Supp. at 858.
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risks of this product outweighed its utility.118
Finally, in Kotler v. American Tobacco Co.," 9 the widow of a
smoker who had died of lung cancer brought suit against several
cigarette companies on the theories of negligence, breach of war-
ranty and misrepresentation." ° A federal district court, apply-
ing Massachusetts law, ruled in favor the defendants.12" ' On ap-
peal, the plaintiff argued that a design defect claim was cogniza-
ble under Massachusetts law on the basis of its inherently dan-
gerous characteristics.'22 According to the plaintiff, "when one
balances risk against utility, cigarettes per se are so unreason-
ably dangerous as to be actionably defective."'"
While Massachusetts did not recognize strict liability in tort,
the federal appeals court observed that state warranty law was
"congruent in nearly all respects with the principles expressed in
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). '124 Accordingly,
the court applied a tort liability analysis while utilizing the rhet-
oric of warranty law. Applying these principles to the plaintiff's
case, the court concluded that in order to maintain a claim for
defective design under warranty theory, the plaintiff must estab-
lish the existence of a safer alternative design."2 Moreover, the
Kotler court flatly refused to change the existing case law to
allow a risk-utility test to be used." Specifically, the court
stated that:
[i]t is illogical to say that a product is defective in its generic
form when "defect" has historically been measured in reference to
118. Id. at 859.
119. 926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990).
120. Id. at 1219-20.
121. First, the district court held that all claims based on inadequate warnings
subsequent to 1966 were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertis-
ing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988). See Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 685 F.
Supp. 15, 18 (D. Mass. 1987). The court later dismissed the plaintiffs design defect
claim because no evidence had been produced that the cigarettes were defective in a
manner beyond the inherent characteristics of tobacco. See Kotler v. American Tobac-
co Co., 731 F. Supp. 50, 55-57 (D. Mass. 1990). The case was eventually tried on a
negligence theory and resulted in a jury verdict for the remaining defendant. Kotler,
926 F.2d at 1220.
122. Kotler, 926 F.2d at 1224.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. (quoting Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 968 (1978)).
125. Id. at 1225 (holding that "a design defect case premised on breach of war-
ranty is ...dependent on proof of the existence of a safer alternative design").
126. Id.
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the availability, or at least the feasibility, of safer
alternatives.'27
Accordingly, the federal appeals court upheld the lower court's
dismissal of the plaintiffs design defect claims.128
3. The Doctrinal Argument Against Product Category Liability
As the foregoing discussion has shown, injured parties must
prove that a product is defective in order to recover against a
product seller. Furthermore, this requirement cannot be satisfied
by merely showing that the product is inherently dangerous."
Instead, the plaintiff must be able to point to some sort of modi-
fication or alternative design that would have made the product
safer without changing its inherent nature or function."3' Thus,
the doctrine of strict products liability, at least in its convention-
al form, appears to offer little support for the imposition of cate-
gorical liability on product sellers. Nor can the traditional rules
with respect to ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activi-
ties be stretched to extend categorical liability to inherently
dangerous products.'' Consequently, given the present state of
the law, it seems unlikely that cigarette smokers will be able to
recover against tobacco companies for smoking-related injuries.
Of course, courts could depart from existing doctrine and rec-
ognize categorical liability as a new theory of recovery for injured
consumers. This would permit smokers to argue that the risks of
ordinary cigarettes outweigh their social utility. However, most
courts seem to be unwilling to embrace categorical liability in the
absence of a compelling public policy basis to do so. Accordingly,
the next part of this article will consider policy arguments for
and against the imposition of categorical liability on cigarette
manufacturers.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1226.
129. This assumes, of course, that the danger is a matter of common knowledge or
that the product seller has provided an adequate warning.
130. See e.g., Kotler, 926 F.2d at 1225.
131. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Those who favor the imposition of categorical liability upon
tobacco companies have relied upon various policy arguments to
support their position. However, opponents of such liability have
raised policy concerns of their own.
A. The Case for Product Category Liability
Proponents of categorical liability contend that subjecting
tobacco companies to categorical liability will reduce accident
costs by forcing these companies to internalize the costs of smok-
ing-related injuries.'32 They also claim that it is desirable to
hold cigarette companies liable for smoking-related injuries be-
cause they can reduce the cost of such injuries to individual
victims and spread them among the smoking public." Finally,
they argue that imposing liability on cigarette manufacturers
will prevent them from receiving an unmerited windfall and will
punish them for their antisocial behavior."M
1. Accident Cost Avoidance
Conventional wisdom assumes that accident costs will be re-
duced to an optimal level if product sellers are held liable to
consumers for product-related injuries."13 In the absence of
such liability, producers have little incentive to make their prod-
ucts safer; however, when producers are required to compensate
injured consumers, they have an incentive to avoid such liability
by investing more resources in product safety.'36 A manufactur-
er will spend money on accident cost avoidance as long as the
marginal cost of additional accident cost reduction is less than
the marginal reduction of expected tort liability."7 The same
132. See discussion infra part III.A.1.
133. See discussion infra part III.A.2.
134. See discussion infra part III.A.3.
135. See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History
of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STuD. 461, 520
(1985) ("Society will benefit from internalizing the costs of operation to product man-
ufacturers, including losses from resulting product-related injuries.").
136. See Craig Brown, Deterrence and Accident Compensation Schemes, 17 W. ONT.
L. REv. 111, 128 (1978) (explaining that "[strict liability] provides an incentive for
those engaged in a particular activity to make it safer, for by doing so, their costs
will be lower").
137. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The
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manufacturer, however, will choose to pay damages to injured
parties when the marginal cost of additional accident cost avoid-
ance exceeds the marginal benefit of further accident cost
savings."'
Of course, tort liability will have little effect on manufacturer
behavior if cigarettes are inherently dangerous and cannot be
made any safer.'39 However, even in this situation, tort liability
can have an indirect effect on accident costs. This is because
inherently dangerous products cost less and are thus in higher
demand than market forces would ordinarily dictate if the price
of the product does not reflect the true costs of production, in-
cluding accident costs associated with the use or consumption of
the product. " ' But tort liability forces the sellers of inherently
dangerous products to raise their prices in order to offset the
costs of increased liability 4' and this, in turn, causes the de-
mand for such products to decline. " 2 As use and consumption
fall, so do the accident costs associated with such products.4
This analysis seems to apply nicely to cigarettes: at the pres-
Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 768 (1983) (stating
that "a manufacturer will respond to threatened liability by investing in safety up to,
but not beyond, the point at which the marginal costs of the investment equal the
marginal costs of accidents thereby avoided").
138. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33
(1972) (arguing that "[w]hen the costs of accidents is less than the cost of prevention,
a rational profit-maximizing enterprise will pay tort judgments to the accident vic-
tims rather than incur the larger cost of avoiding liability").
139. Some commentators argue that cigarettes can be made safer. See e.g., Donald
W. Garner, Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, 26 EMoRY L.J. 269, 275-76 (1977) (stating
that tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide levels can be reduced by using more efficient
filters, developing new types of tobacco leaf, and by using better processing methods).
140. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 70 (1970).
141. See Andrew 0. Smith, The Manufacture and Distribution of Handguns as an
Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 369, 376 (1987) ("Under a strict
liability regime, manufacturers will face a higher marginal cost curve and will corre-
spondingly charge higher prices.").
142. See Frontier, supra note 46, at 1273 ("[D]efect-free products liability would re-
duce the consumption of relatively risky products by increasing their monetary costs
to users and consumers, thereby placing such products at a competitive disadvantage
in the market.").
143. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Extending the Boundaries of Strict Products
Liability: Implications of the Theory of the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1036,
1040 (1980) [hereinafter Boundaries] (arguing that "by causing the prices of products
and services to reflect more fully their defect-related accident costs, strict liability
helps to reduce . . . overconsumption and thus to reduce the overall costs of defect-
related accidents").
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ent time, the price of cigarettes does not reflect the full health
costs of smoking because a substantial share of these costs are
shifted to nonsmokers.'" Consequently, smokers "overconsume"
tobacco products, thereby causing society to expend more re-
sources on smoking-related health care than are justified by the
economic benefits of smoking.'" However, if some of the health
costs of smoking are shifted to tobacco companies, they will be
forced to raise their prices, with a concomitant decrease in con-
sumption and smoking-related injuries.'"
2. Risk Spreading
Conventional wisdom assumes that the economic dislocation
associated with product-related injuries can be lessened if acci-
dent costs are spread among a large group instead of being borne
entirely by individual victims. 147 When product-related injuries
are involved, product sellers are in a better position than con-
sumers to spread these losses." In a normally competitive
market, producers can compensate those who are injured by
their products (either directly or through the purchase of liability
insurance), and can pass these costs on to their customers in the
form of higher prices. 49
144. See Note, Plaintiffs Conduct as a Defense to Claims Against Cigarette Manu-
facturers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 809, 823 (1986) (stating that "[t]hose smoking-related
health care costs not paid for by public programs are largely absorbed into private-
sector loss spreading mechanisms--like pooled health insurance-and are consequent-
ly not reflected in the price of cigarettes.
145. Id. at 824.
146. Id.
147. See Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73
CAL. L. REV. 772, 794 (1985) ("Spreading the impact of loss over time or among a
class of individuals will decrease economic dislocation, thereby reducing secondary
costs.").
148. See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negli-
gence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 596
(1980) (explaining that "[tihe manufacturer can spread risk through insurance and
price adjustments, whereas the individual might suffer a crushing blow underwriting
the loss himself'); Kathleen M. McLeod, Note, The Great American Smokeout: Hold-
ing Cigarette Manufacturers Liable for Failing to Provide Adequate Warnings of the
Hazards of Smoking, 27 B.C. L. REV. 1033, 1072 (1986) (stating that a principle
purpose of the imposition of strict liability is to place the cost of injury on the man-
ufacturer who can spread the cost among all consumers by adjusting the price of the
product).
149. See Page Keeton, Products Liability--Some Observations About Allocation of
Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1333 (1966).
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This risk-spreading rationale appears to support the imposi-
tion of liability on cigarette companies. The market for tobacco
products is large: at least fifty million Americans presently
smoke15° and tobacco companies sell more than 600 billion ciga-
rettes a year.151 Moreover, despite the public concern about
health risks, the tobacco industry continues to be highly profit-
able." 2 For these reasons, tobacco companies should be easily
able to spread accident costs.
3. Moral Issues
Some commentators argue that moral considerations have a
significant role to play in the law of products liability." One
important moral consideration is corrective justice, which is
concerned with rectifying wrongful gains and losses."5 The
principle of corrective justice requires those who profit from
wrongdoing to compensate those who are injured as the result of
their improper conduct.'55 From this perspective, it can be ar-
gued that cigarette manufacturers who profit from the sale of a
dangerous product are obliged, as a matter of corrective justice,
to compensate those who are injured from the consumption of to-
bacco products."s
150. See Note, supra note 144, at 809 n.5.
151. See Bryan D. McElvaine, Note, Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers for Smok-
ing Induced Illnesses and Deaths, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 165, 167 n.2 (1986).
152. See Clara Sue Ross, Comment, Judicial and Legislative Control of the Tobacco
Industry: Toward a Smoke-Free Society?, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 317, 332 (1987) ('The
tobacco industry in the United States ranks among the top five industries in terms
of sales, assets, and profits.").
153. See, e.g., David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law:
Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 430 (1993) (arguing that prod-
uct accidents are moral, not technological events, and that principles of products
liability law should thus turn on moral theory).
154. See Richard C. Ausness, Compensation for Smoking-Related Injuries: An Alter-
native to Strict Liability in Tort, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1085, 1093 (1990) (hereinafter
Smoking-Related Injuries].
155. See Jules Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD.
421, 423 (1982).
156. See Wertheimer, supra note 2, at 1447 (stating that "[c]igarette manufactur-
ers . . . receive a windfall because they collect profits on sales of their product, but
do not pay its true costs").
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B. The Case Against Product Category Liability
Most commentators agree that the sellers of dangerous prod-
ucts ought to pay for the injuries that their products cause to
innocent consumers. However, there is little agreement about
whether this objective can best be achieved by subjecting produc-
ers to product category liability. This section identifies some of
the arguments against the imposition of categorical liability.
1. Accident Cost Avoidance
As mentioned earlier, the imposition of categorical liability
upon product sellers is supposed to force them to raise prices,
which will thereby lower consumer demand for dangerous prod-
ucts and reduce product-related accident costs. 1' Unfortunate-
ly, however, subjecting sellers to such liability may actually in-
crease accident costs in some circumstances.
Specifically, consumers will turn to substitutes if the price of a
product or activity substantially rises because of government reg-
ulation or increased tort liability." This substitution is a man-
ifestation of the "theory of the second best."'159 The effect can be
beneficial if consumers seek less dangerous alternatives to the
activity or product in question; however, accident costs may actu-
ally increase if consumers choose more dangerous substi-
tutes."c For example, deaths and injuries from the consump-
tion of contaminated whiskey rose dramatically during the Prohi-
bition period because drinkers who were unable to purchase
liquor legally purchased bootleg whiskey instead. 6'
It is hard to say what smokers would do if the price of ciga-
rettes increased enormously or if tobacco companies were driven
out of business by overwhelming tort liability. 6 ' Given the ad-
157. See discussion supra part III.A.1.
158. See Frontier, supra note 46, at 1291 (explaining that a system of regulation
"increases the liability costs of the regulated firms to the point where they and the
consumers with whom they deal turn to new patterns of essentially unregulable
behavior to escape the higher liability costs of the regulated markets").
159. For a more detailed discussion of the theory of the second best, see
Boundaries, supra note 143, at 1059-65.
160. See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 292 (1985) ("Patchy, erratic risk
internalization may impose greater costs on the safer substitutes within particular
markets, and so may encourage a shift in consumption toward the more hazardous.").
161. See Frontier, supra note 46, at 1291 n.105.
162. See Mary Griffen, Note, The Smoldering Issue in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
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dictive nature of cigarettes," it is possible that frustrated
smokers would turn to bootleg products if cigarettes became
difficult to obtain at reasonable prices. However, a more likely
scenario is that new cigarette companies would enter the mar-
ket. Since existing tobacco companies would immediately feel the
effects of enhanced tort liability, they would have to raise their
prices at once. However, new producers would not have to worry
about liability for many years and, therefore, could sell their
cigarettes for less.164 This, in turn, would force existing compa-
nies to lower their prices or leave the market. 5' In either
event, cigarette prices would not rise as predicted by the theory
of market deterrence. Thus, cigarette consumption would not
decrease nor would smoking-related illnesses decline.
2. Risk Spreading
It was suggested above that product sellers could spread risks
better than consumers. This view, however, has not gone
unchallenged." For example, it has been pointed out that tort
law often duplicates other loss-spreading mechanisms such as
private insurance and workers compensation. 7 Furthermore,
Inc.: Process Concerns in Determining Whether Cigarettes Are a Defectively Designed
Product, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 606, 622 (1988) (suggesting that some smokers might
"'replace' cigarettes with chewing tobacco, gum chewing, overeating, or knitting,"
while others might seek no replacement).
163. See Ross, supra note 152, at 319.
164. See Gregory P. Taxin, Tobacco Industry Liability for Cigarette-Related Injuries:
"Smokers, Give It Up!", 16 J. PROD. & TOXICs LIAs. 221, 247 (1994) (stating that
"products produced by legitimate, going concerns will include the expected cost of
harm done by cigarettes, but cigarettes produced by those who expect their liability
to be zero . . . will not include the 'true' cost of smoking").
165. For example, existing tobacco companies might leave the American market to
the new cigarette companies and concentrate their marketing efforts overseas.
166. See James E. Britain, Product Honesty Is the Best Policy: A Comparison of
Doctors' and Manufacturers' Duty to Disclose Drug Risks and the Importance of Con-
sumer Expectations in Determining Product Defect, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 342, 410 (1984)
(declaring that "[tihe blithe assumption underlying loss spreading arguments that
manufacturers are in a better position than consumers to both bear and spread loss-
es has never been empirically verified").
167. See George L. Priest, The Continuing Crisis in Liability, 1 PROD. LIAB. L.J.
243, 248 (1989) (stating that "[t]oday, the compensation provided by the legal system
is largely redundant. Workers filing 60% of products liability claims are already cov-
ered for disability losses and full medical expenses through workers' compensation.
Most ordinary consumers have private insurance or qualify for government health
and income maintenance programs"); Stephen D. Sugarman, Serious Tort Reform, 24
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the tort system is regressive because every consumer pays the
same "premium" for protection against injury, but wealthier
claimants tend to receive higher damage awards. 6 '
Of more importance, for risk spreading to work properly, the
losses involved must not exceed the resources of the risk spread-
er. As the recent experience of the asbestos industry demon-
strates, accident costs cannot be spread effectively when the
legal system retroactively imposes massive liability upon an
industry. When faced with such overwhelming liability, product
sellers invariably seek protection in bankruptcy.6 9 When this
occurs, only few victims will be fully compensated and many will
receive inadequate compensation or nothing at all. Consequently,
if cigarette companies are subjected to excessive liability, they
may be unable to function effectively as loss spreaders. 7 '
There is yet another reason why product category liability will
not promote risk spreading. As mentioned earlier, under some
circumstances, the imposition of categorical liability will encour-
age the entry of new sellers into the market because they will
not be subject to tort liability for many years to come.' 7 ' Some
of these firms may choose to market their products for ten or
twenty years and then go out of business before any of their
customers begin to develop smoking-related illnesses.'72 Of
course, if this occurs, there will be no funds available to compen-
sate smokers when they eventually become ill and file claims. In
this author's view, it is not unlikely that new entrants into the
cigarette market will adopt such hit-and-run tactics, leaving
their former customers high and dry.
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795, 798 (1987) (stating that "once tort law finally does deliver
money to victims, a considerable sum goes to duplicate compensation that they other-
wise have or will receive from other sources, such as health insurance, sick leave,
Social Security, and the like").
168. See George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. REV.
1, 17 (1987) ("[Tlort law's lumping of low-income consumers and high-income consum-
ers into the same insurance pool and charging them a similar premium for insurance
forces low-income consumers to subsidize high-income consumers.").
169. See generally, Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L.
REV. 429 (1986) (discussing the Johns-Manville bankruptcy); Note, The Manville
Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1121 (1983).
170. See Smoking-Related Injuries, supra note 154, at 1120.
171. See discussion supra part III.B.1.
172. See Taxin, supra note 164, at 247 (arguing that some manufacturers "will
plan on being long gone by the time a cause of action ripens").
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Thus, while risk spreading is viewed as an attractive goal by
many, there is no assurance that product category liability will
improve the chances of compensation for injured consumers.
Indeed, if the legal system imposes excessive liability on product
sellers, their ability to spread losses may be completely de-
stroyed.
3. Moral Issues
Moral concerns do not provide much support for a general rule
of product category liability because the moral positions of prod-
uct sellers and product users vary according to the product in
question. However, principles of corrective justice appear to sup-
port the imposition of some liability upon tobacco companies.'
For more than a century, tobacco companies have sold a danger-
ous product to the public. Despite growing scientific evidence
that smoking causes lung cancer and other diseases,74 ciga-
rette companies failed to provide any warnings about the health
risks of smoking until required to do so by statute.'75 Even
now, the tobacco industry continues to deny that smoking is
hazardous. 7 ' Other practices, if true, such as directing ciga-
rette advertising at children'77 and regulating nicotine levels in
cigarettes,178 are also morally wrong. Consequently, the level of
wrongdoing attributable to tobacco companies may be sufficient
to give rise to an obligation to compensate.
However, the duty to compensate may also be affected by the
moral position of the victim. In the case of smokers, this position
173. See Wertheimer, supra note 2, at 1447.
174. See Marc Z. Edell, Cigarette Litigation: The Second Wave, 22 ToRT & INS.
L.J. 90, 97 (1986) (declaring that medical literature "confirms the fact that the medi-
cal and scientific community was concerned with the potential cancer-causing effects
of tobacco products as early as the 1920s, and certainly by the late 1930s medical
and scientific research demonstrated a strong association between cigarette smoking
and cancer").
175. See Richard C. Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public Pol-
icy and Alternative Compensation Systems, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 897, 901 (1988).
176. See McLeod, supra note 148, at 1066-67 ("[Cligarette manufacturers deny the
health hazards of smoking and challenge any medical studies as 'biased' and 'unsci-
entific."').
177. According to the FDA, advertising by tobacco companies has created a "perva-
sive and positive imagery that has for decades helped to foster a youth market for
tobacco products." 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,326 (1995).
178. See Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Nicotine Withdrawal: Assessing the FDA's
Effort to Regulate Tobacco Products, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1996).
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is somewhat ambiguous. Arguably, many consumers were not
really aware of the actual health risks of smoking when they
began to smoke. 179 Moreover, once individuals have taken up
the habit, the addictive nature of tobacco has made it very diffi-
cult for many of them to stop smoking. On the other hand, ciga-
rette packages have contained health warnings for more than
thirty years. Thus smokers cannot claim to be ignorant of the
dangers of smoking." ° Furthermore, while smoking is habit-
forming, and perhaps even addictive, millions of smokers have
successfully quit over the past three decades. 8'
Furthermore, if smokers are allowed to recover under a theory
of product category liability, they will not only seek compensa-
tion for medical expenses and lost wages, but they will also de-
mand large sums for pain and suffering and punitive damages.
Considering that injured smokers are at least partly responsible
for their situation, a more limited level of compensation seems
appropriate.
IV. THE USE OF TORT LIABILITY TO CONTROL THE CONSUMPTION OF
INHERENTLY DANGEROUS PRODUCTS
Even if we conclude that some products, such as cigarettes,
are so inherently dangerous that society should discourage their
consumption, it remains to be seen whether tort law should be
used for this purpose. First, it is difficult to apply the risk-utility
analysis as a liability standard. Second, courts are not competent
to make decisions about what products are suitable for consum-
ers. Third, tort law is an extremely expensive way to regulate
product safety.
179. See McLeod, supra note 148, at 1061 (claiming that "even today, despite the
accumulation of scientific evidence ... the American public remains remarkably
unaware of the specific dangers of cigarette smoking").
180. See Donald W. Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest
Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1429 (1980) ('The days when plaintiff could hon-
estly claim that he did not know that cigarettes are injurious are over.").
181. OFFICE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVIC-
ES, PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL 175 (1994) (noting that over forty-four million Americans have quit smoking
since 1994).
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A. Problems with the Liability Standard
Under the risk-utility test, a product is regarded as defective if
the risks associated with a product as designed outweigh the
benefits of the same product equipped with a feasible alternative
design.182 In this context, the risk-utility test is reasonably
manageable because the fact-finder is ordinarily required to
compare a specific aspect of the product's design with a relatively
close substitute.1" In contrast, the risk-utility analysis is much
more difficult to apply to an entire category of products. This is
partly because it is very hard for private litigants to obtain reli-
able information about the overall costs and benefits of products.
Take the case of cigarettes. The costs of smoking are known in a
general sort of way. Smoking is known to cause lung cancer and
may be responsible for other forms of cancer as well; smoking
also contributes to heart disease; and, finally, smoking has also
been linked to a variety of chronic obstructive lung diseases."
However, it is virtually impossible to quantify these costs in dol-
lar terms. Estimates of the annual health care costs attributable
to smoking range from $13 billion to $22 billion," while esti-
mates of productivity losses due to smoking vary even more
widely." It is even more difficult to put a dollar value on
smoking-related deaths or to the pain and suffering that is in-
flicted on the victims of smoking-related illnesses.
Quantifying the benefit side of smoking is even more problem-
atical. Smoking does give pleasure. However, this benefit is he-
donic and, therefore, not easily monetizable. One way to measure
the utility of smoking is to calculate the amount of money that
consumers are willing to pay for tobacco products. 87 However,
182. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
183. See Frontier, supra note 46, at 1305.
184. See generally Taxin, supra note 164, at 222-33 (describing the various health
effects of smoking); Michael K Mahoney, Comment, Coughing Up the Cash: Should
Medicaid Provide for Independent State Recovery Against Third-Party Tortfeasors Such
as the Tobacco Industry?, 24 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 233, 235-36 (1996) (also de-
scribing the health effects of smoking).
185. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 184, at 238 ($21.9 billion); McLeod, supra note
148, at 1072 n.317 ($13 billion).
186. See William Kepko, Comment, Products Liability-Can It Kick the Smoking
Habit?, 19 AKRON L. REV. 269, 269 (1985) ($27 billion); Vincent Blasi & Henry P.
Monaghan, The First Amendment and Cigarette Advertising, 256 JAMA 502, 502
(1986) ($43 billion).
187. See Griffin, supra note 162, at 616.
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even if one could calculate the actual retail sales price of all
cigarettes sold in America during a given period, this figure
would not necessarily represent the true utility of smoking be-
cause consumers might actually be willing to pay much more for
cigarettes." The difference between the price consumers are
willing to pay for a product and the price they actually pay in
the market is known as the "consumer surplus."'89 Unless we
can calculate this consumer surplus, we cannot determine the
utility of smoking for purposes of risk-utility analysis.
B. Institutional Competence
The vagueness of the risk-utility test potentially allows courts
and juries to exercise enormous power over the economic welfare
of entire industries."9° As numerous courts19 and commenta-
tors"'92 have observed, it is better that important social deci-
sions be made by other institutions of government. The ad-
versarial nature of the litigation process, limited resources, and
restrictive rules of evidence all limit the courts' access to infor-
mation and public input. 93 This makes them social engineers.
188. See Michael D. Green, The Schizophrenia of Risk-Benefit Analysis in Design
Defect Litigation, 48 VAND. L. REv. 609, 622 (1995).
189. See Kim D. Larsen, Note, Strict Products Liability and the Risk-Utility Test
for Design Defect: An Economic Analysis, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 2045, 2054 (1984).
190. See Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 731 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D. Mass.), affid,
926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990) (arguing that "the risk/utility theory is a radical doc-
trine which imprudently arrogates to the judicial process some very significant soci-
etal determinations").
191. See, e.g., Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1216 (N.D. Tex.
1985) ("Moreover, the judicial system is, at best, ill-equipped to deal with the emo-
tional issues of handgun control."); Hilberg v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 761 P.2d 236, 241
(Colo. Ct. App. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352
(Colo. 1992) ("Questions concerning the social or societal utility of firearms and how
and by whom they may be possessed and used are major public policy questions
which properly reside with constitutional assemblies and legislative bodies.").
192. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 55, at 407 (acknowledging that "the court
system does not possess the necessary tools to make fair and rational categorical
assessments as called for by categorical liability, and that . .. assessments, there-
fore, should be left to the legislature"); Larsen, supra note 189, at 2061; Toke, supra
note 10, at 1210.
193. See Toke, supra note 10, at 1209 ('The judiciary, however, lacks the instru-
ments or techniques needed to ascertain and evaluate vast amounts of relevant social
and behavioral data."); Note, Handguns and Products Liability, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1912, 1925 (1984) ("Courts are designed to handle discrete cases on the basis of an
evidentiary record; they are not efficient regulators. They cannot continually check
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In contrast, legislative bodies and administrative agencies are
better equipped to address broader social issues such as those
associated with product safety.
194
C. Litigation Costs
In comparison to other regulatory mechanisms, another prob-
lem with the tort system is its high operating cost.195 According
to one estimate, plaintiffs spend between $7 billion and $9 billion
each year in legal fees and expenses, while defendants and their
insurers spend another $8 billion to $10 billion to defend against
claims.19
Furthermore, there is reason to believe that litigation costs
would be particularly high if cigarette companies were suddenly
subjected to tort liability. In the first place, the imposition of
product category liability would generate a massive number of
lawsuits."s1 Moreover, many of these suits would involve multi-
ple parties.19  Finally, lawsuits against tobacco companies
would require the adjudication of complicated causation is-
sues.199
V. ALTERNATIVES TO PRODUCT CATEGORY LIABILITY
There are a number of approaches that are more promising
than product category liability. These approaches include in-
creased government regulation, narrowly-targeted statutory com-
pensation schemes, and increased taxation of dangerous prod-
ucts.
the effects of their decisions and make fine alterations as needed.").
194. See Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a "Strong" Regulatory Compliance De-
fense, 55 MD. L. REV. 1210, 1219-20 (1996) [hereinafter "Strong" Regulatory Compli-
ance] (comparing agency decisionmaking with the judicial process).
195. See JOHN G. FLEMING, THE AMERICAN TORT PROCESS 18 (1988) ("The most
negative feature of the tort system is its staggering overhead cost.").
196. See JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID
IN TORT LITIGATION vii-viii (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 1986).
197. See Smoking-Related Injuries, supra note 154, at 1121.
198. Id. at 1121-22.
199. See Frontier, supra note 46, at 1303 ("The questions whether the plaintiff's
illness was caused by smoking and, if so, which producers' products are implicated,
in many cases, would defy coherent resolution.").
452 [Vol. 24:3
PRODUCT CATEGORY LIABILITY
A. Government Regulation
If society is concerned with reducing product-related accident
costs, it should consider direct regulation as an alternative to in-
creased tort liability. Tort rules are often vague and uncertain,
and therefore often send weak signals to product sellers. In con-
trast, regulatory agencies have the necessary competence and
resources to make informed decisions about product safety; their
regulations are uniform and specific; and they have the means to
monitor and enforce compliance.2"
In the past, tobacco products have not been subject to product
safety regulation by the federal government except in the area of
health warnings.2"' Recently, however, the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration began to regulate the advertising, distribution and
sale of tobacco products to children and adolescents."2 Al-
though one may question the FDA's existing authority to regu-
late cigarettes as medical devices,0 ' there is little doubt that
Congress has the power to regulate tobacco products if it chooses
to do so. Such regulations could take the form of required warn-
ings or disclosures, control over nicotine content, required safety
devices such as filters, or quality standards for tobacco.
B. Statutory Compensation Schemes
If compensation is an important goal, a narrowly-focused com-
pensation scheme might serve this purpose better than tort law.
Tort law is much more expensive to operate than compensation
mechanisms like social security and workers compensation.0 4
Tort victims typically receive less than half of the money paid
out by defendants to settle claims,0 5 while private health in-
200. See "Strong" Regulatory Compliance, supra note 194, at 1218-21.
201. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341
(1988); Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-
4408 (1988).
202. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 801, 803, 807,
820 and 897).
203. See Noah, supra note 178, at 21 ("Even assuming that the nicotine in tobacco
products falls within the FDA's authority over drugs, the treatment of such products
as medical devices seems tenuous.").
204. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555,
596 (1985) ("[The tort system is fabulously expensive to operate in comparison to
modern compensation systems.").
205. See Robert L. Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN
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surance plans and workers compensation systems require much
less than that to operate.2" It would certainly be feasible to set
up a system, modeled after the federal Black Lung program,
under which tobacco companies could be assessed a certain
amount to compensate injured smokers according to a specific
compensation formula."7
A more modest compensation scheme might rely on Medicare
and Medicaid programs. Recently, a number of states have sued
tobacco companies to recover medical costs for smoking-related
illnesses that they have paid out through their Medicaid pro-
grams. °s Regardless of the outcome of these suits, Congress
might enact appropriate legislation to require tobacco companies
to pay for some of the Medicaid and Medicare costs that are
attributable to smoking.
C. Taxation
At present, both the states and the federal government levy
excise taxes upon tobacco products.2 9 However, the revenues
from these taxes are not earmarked for any particular purpose,
but instead go into a general fund.210 It would be possible, and
perhaps desirable, to increase these taxes substantially and dedi-
cate them to the funding of Medicare, Medicaid, and other pro-
grams that treat smoking-related injuries.211 This would ensure
DIEGO L. REv. 13, 35 (1988) ("Reduced to a single figure, injury victims were receiv-
ing less than half of every dollar expended by the system on accident claims.").
206. See ROBERT E. LITAN, THE LIABILITY EXPLOSION AND AMERICAN TRADE PER-
FORMANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES, IN TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 127, 135
(Peter H. Schuck, ed. 1991) ("In contrast, 'transaction costs' consume 30% of the costs
of the workers compensation system, 15% of health insurance, and just 1% of the
social security system.").
207. See Smoking-Related Injuries, supra note 154, at 1124-33 (describing a pro-
posed compensation system for smoking-related injuries).
208. See Mahoney, supra note 184, at 239-44 (describing state suits against tobac-
co companies).
209. See, e.g., Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition Poli-
cies and Reform, 40 VILL. L. REV. 383 n.171 (1995) (noting that federal and state
tobacco excise taxes raised more than $11 billion in 1992); E. WHELEN, A SMOKING
GUN: How THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY GETS AWAY WITH MURDER, 149 (1984) (stating
that federal, state and municipal revenues from excise and sales taxes on tobacco
totaled at least $7 billion in 1981).
210. See Frank J. Vandall, Reallocating the Costs of Smoking: The Application of
Absolute Liability to Cigarette Manufacturers, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 418-19 (1991).
211. See Ahron Leichtman, The Top Ten Ways to Attack the Tobacco Industry and
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that tobacco companies pay for some of the social costs of smok-
ing. At the same time, however, tax rates could be kept low
enough to prevent tobacco companies from going out of business.
CONCLUSION
As a general proposition, product sellers should be made to
pay for the injuries caused by their products. However, tort law
is a crude, and often ineffective, tool for this purpose. In their
present form, tort law principles effectively immunize the sellers
of inherently dangerous products from liability as long as they
properly warn consumers about these unavoidable risks. Profes-
sor Wertheimer proposes to remedy this deficiency by allowing
courts to subject product sellers to liability when product-related
risks outweigh benefits. If this approach is accepted, courts
would be able employ this risk-utility analysis to impose liability
on tobacco companies. Although this extension of tort liability
would force tobacco companies to bear a share of the social costs
associated with their products, in the long run it would have a
variety of undesirable consequences.
Win the War Against Smoking, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 729, 741 (arguing that
"tobacco tax revenues should be earmarked for specific anti-tobacco or health-related
purposes").
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